Data and supplementary information from the experiment reported in:

Alexander W. Cappelen, Trond Halvorsen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, Bertil
Tungodden, Face-saving or fair-minded: What motivates moral behavior?,
Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 15, Issue 3, July
2017, Pages 540–557, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvw014

Abstract: We study the relative importance of intrinsic moral
motivation and extrinsic social motivation in explaining moral
behavior. The key feature of our experiment is that we introduce a
dictator game design that manipulates these two sources of
motivation. In one set of treatments, we manipulate the moral argument
for sharing, in another we manipulate the information given to the
recipient about the context of the experiment and the dictator's
decision. The paper offers two main findings. First, we provide
evidence of intrinsic moral motivation being of fundamental
importance. Second, we show that extrinsic social motivation matters
and is crowding-in with intrinsic moral motivation. We also show that
intrinsic moral motivation is strongly associated with self-reported
charitable giving outside the lab and with political
preferences. (JEL: D63)


Files contained in this deposit:

readme.txt: This file.

mmexit_webappendix.pdf: Instructions from the experiment.

situations.csv: Data from experiment. All the data are enclosed in this comma-
	separated-value file. Variable names are given in first line. 200
	observations. Below are the file contents and variable descriptions:

	pid: noninformative participant id

	kull: Year of study (1-5). Exact question: "Hvilket kull går du på?"

	sex: Sex. Exact question: "Er du mann eller kvinne?"
		coded:
		1: male
		2: female

	age: In years (18-34). Exact question: "Hvor gammel er du?"

	charity: Categorical variable for last years's contribution to charitable causes.
		Exact question: "Hvor mye har du i løpet av det siste året gitt til veldedige formål?"
		coded: 
			0: nothing
			1: below 500 NOK
			2: 500-1500 NOK
			3: 1500-5000 NOK
			4: Above 5000 NOK

	election: Vote in previous election. 6 participants chose not not to answer, 
	so 194 observations. Exact question: "Hvilket parti stemte du på ved forrige valg?"
		coded:
			1: SV
			2: Ap
			3: Sp
			4: V
			5: Krf
			6: H
			7: Frp
			9: Other party

	treatment: String identifier for treatment (explained in paper). 
		coded: 
			T1: Recipient is a non-working student, information is complete.
			T1*: Recipient is a non-working student, no information.
			T2: Recipient is a working student, information is complete.
			T2*: Recipient is a working student, no information.
			T3: Recipient is microcredit client, information is complete.
			T3*: Recipient is microcredit client, no information.

	decision: String identifiying choice made about information.
		coded:
			ENTRY: Elect to have information sent (in treatments T1*, T2*, T3*).
			EXIT: Elect to not have information sent (in treatments T1, T2, T3).
			NO: Made no choice to the information that would be sent.

	given1: Amount given in dictator game with default information. In NOK (0-200). 

	given2: If decision was ENTRY or EXIT, revised amount in dictator game. 
		In NOK (0-200). 88 observations.

	given_hypo: If decision was made to not change information sent (NO), response
		about hypothetical decision if they had (counterfactually) changed the 
		information. In NOK (0-200). 112 observations.




